What Does The Bible Really Teach: Dr.J.Beduhn and R.Hommel: A Discussion upon the translation of John 1:1c.

Dr.J.Beduhn and R.Hommel: A Discussion upon the translation of John 1:1c.

(originally on the Christian Apologetics Research Ministry JW discussion board during Jan/Feb, 2002 and continuing later elsewhere. There are 4 parts in total to this discussion)

Part 1

Dr. BeDuhn,

Again, thank you for your previous comments. I would like to ask a couple questions and make some observations, if I may. I do appreciate the time you're giving us on this topic.

I'll introduce your comments with PROFESSOR, my responses with ROBERT.

PROFESSOR: Certainly Metzger is a giant in my field, and he has made very important contributions that are unimpeachable. I can hope to accomplish only a fraction of what he has accomplished in his eighty years, and I am still relatively early in my career. The fact remains that in his published remarks on John 1:1c, Metzger argues primarily on the basis of theology, rather than language. His only linguistic argument is "Colwell's Rule," which he misunderstands, just as you recognize. So on this particular topic, Metzger fares rather poorly, despite his expertise and accomplishments in other areas.

I believe you concur with this methodology, for you say: "What John's language does provide is a reference to logos, which has philosophical and theological meaning in the time of John that we can draw on to better understand what he is conveying, and a careful presentation throughout the gospel that fills in some of the things we need to understand about the Word-become-flesh/Christ. That is what the reader should attend to." Since you are not engaging in theology when you attend to these matters in John's Gospel, I don't think its quite fair to accuse Metzger of doing so.

PROFESSOR: Colwell is another person who contributed tremendous advances to our field, and is rightly honored for them. Yet, even though his "rule" cannot, as formulated, settle the translation of John 1:1c, it is in fact a completely imaginary rule of Greek grammar, without any valid foundation. Here again, a mistake has been made by an otherwise great scholar. And it is quite common to find that such mistakes occur where theological interest has temporarily interfered with scholarly objectivity.

"Definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article" (Colwell, p. 20).
This rule, as stated, is, I believe, fairly well substantiated. That is, if one begins with nouns in the semantic category "definite" and examines their occurance in pre- and post-copulative constructions, it is not hard to demonstrate that "usually" definite nouns in pre-copulative constructions are anarthrous. Colwell himself provides the foundation by the statistics he published in his article. McGaughy verified Colwell's statistics - and, indeed, noted that some exceptions Colwell excluded were not exceptions at all, thus strengthening Colwell's argument (McGaughy, Lane C. 1972. Toward a Descriptive Analysis of EINAI as a Linking Verb in New Testament Greek. SBL Dissertation Series 6. Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 70ff). Wallace affirms it (Wallace, Daniel. 1996. Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, p. 260, n 18). Hartley's statistical study also validates Colwell's Rule, as originally stated (Hartley, Don. 1998. "Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass/Count Nouns," http://www.bible.org/docs/nt/topics/colwell.htm, notes 9 and 41). I'm unaware of any study that disputes Colwell's Rule "as formulated."

The problem arises when Colwell himself - and many who followed him - affirmed the consequent of his Rule - that is, "Anarthrous pre-copulative PNs are usually definite." His perfectly valid descriptive Rule was inverted to become a logically invalid and inductively falsifiable prescription for translation. Colwell did not define the converse of his Rule in his article, but he begins to assume it, and finally overtly applies it to John 1:1c.

When most scholars refer to Colwell's rule, they rightly quote the Rule as stated - and it is a valid rule (and useful in the field of textual criticism). However, when they commit the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, and then apply the result to John 1:1, they are, indeed, creating an "imaginary rule." It's too bad that Colwell himself committed this fallacy and so many conservative scholars eagerly followed him in it; but I am encouraged that it has been conservative evangelical scholars who have exposed the error for what it is.

PROFESSOR: So it is not the person, but the evidence and argument in particular instances that must be judged. Metzger and Colwell, as good as they are, are wrong about John 1:1c, and so citing them on one side of the debate offers no valid support.

ROBERT: Agreed. While others may have done so, I don't believe I ever have.

PROFESSOR: You are quite correct that the best judgment of my position will occur when it is assessed by my academic peers. But I trust you have seen enough of my position to know that I argue on the basis of language and literary context, not theology.

ROBERT: It seems to me that everyone has certain presuppositions which govern their beliefs and conclusions. For example, while you may not consider yourself a theologian, I suspect you have a worldview of some sort. You have a set of beliefs - about whether God exists; about whether the Bible is God's Word or man's word; about whether the Bible's is inerrant; about whether we need to harmonize our translation of John 1:1c with Paul's christology or the hyper-monotheism of the author of Deuteronomy and Isaiah (or Deutero-Isaiah, if you prefer). One's beliefs in these areas will certainly affect how one interprets John 1:1, don't you agree? Or am I missing something fundamental, here?

The question is not who has theological presuppositions and who has secular presuppositions - the real question, it seems to me, has already been well articulated - by you! It is who can marshall the most reasonable and best supported argument. Whether such will shake the other person's presuppositions remains to be seen.

PROFESSOR: Even at this point of assessment, one can ask: am I citing the rules and properties of Greek grammar accurately? Ask other experts and see for yourself that I am. Once that is established, then we can move on to questions of how best to render the indefinite theos into English.

ROBERT: At this point, I'm unwilling to concede that the rules and properties of Greek grammar mandate an indefinite semantic force for theos in John 1:1c. Perhaps I'm not as familiar with your position as I should be. Could you elaborate?

Perhaps we should more clearly define our terms. If you ask me what grade my daughter is in, I'll answer "She a second-grader." From my understanding, this would be a classic indefinite usage. I'm saying that she is in the "class" or category of children in the second grade. However, if you ask me if I'm going to take my daughter to see the film The Lord of the Rings, I might answer, "No, she's just a second-grader." Here, my meaning is not that my daughter is a member of a class - but rather that she has the qualities or characteristics of second-graders - that is, she's too young to appreciate the film. This is a qualitative usage. In English, we often use the indefinite article to signify qualitativeness, but not always. Some nouns lend themselves more to a qualitative usage without the article - "man," for instance. If I say to an evolutionist, "Homo Erectus was man," I'm not saying that our ancient ancestor was "a man," (a member of a class or category), nor that he is The Man (definite); instead, I mean that he was fully human - possessing all the qualities, attributes, or characterstics of humanity. Greek grammarians since Robertson (and even some before) have demonstrated that anarthrous nouns in Greek often lay stress on the qualities or characteristics of the noun. The question, then, as you note, is how best to translate this semantic nuance into English. In many occasions, it will have to be with the indefinite article - since English idiom restricts us. In other cases, we may choose an adjective (for example, I think "sinful" works better than "a sinner" for hamartwlos in John 9:24, 25). In some cases, the noun may simply be rendered without either the definite or indefinite article (which is how most translators render kurios in Mark 2:28). The translator must determine what semantic force is predominant (indefiniteness or qualitativeness) and then decide the best English equivalent.

PROFESSOR: Using the indefinite "god" comes first to mind linguistically, but literary context must also be considered, as well as cultural environment which provided meaning to the term logos for John's audience. Harner has argued for a qualitative meaning, and I have no quarrel with his evidence and argument. I have simply asked the question: how does Greek convey quality? And the answer turns out to be either with an adjective or with an indefinite noun of class or category.

ROBERT: I would argue that Greek conveys quality with a qualitative noun. If one accepts qualitativeness as a semantic nuance, I don't see how it's possible to convey that nuance with an indefinite noun (which has an entirely different semantic nuance). In Greek, that is. While we may, in some cases, translate a qualitative noun with an indefinite noun in English, we must, I think, argue from sense, not translation. Either the author intends to convey the qualities of his subject, or he intends to place that subject in a class or category. And while members of a class or category have the attributes associated with that class, that is an extra-linguistic deduction. The author (unless intending ambiguity) places emphasis on one or the other. He or she intends a specific meaning in using a qualitative construction. When the lady at the well calls Jesus "a prophet," she is not merely placing Him in a category of other prophets, but rather is emphasizing Jesus' prophetic attributes that enabled Him inimately to know about her past. Her emphasis is on the qualities of "prophet," not on membership in the class or category of prophets.

I agree that quality can be conveyed with an adjective, but I think an adjectival sense often is less than is intended by a qualitative noun. The lady at the well is, I think, saying more than Jesus is "prophetic." She is saying that He has all the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of a prophet in full measure. Indeed, though the lady does not know this (but John certainly does), Jesus more completely embodies the qualities of "prophet" than does anyone in the OT that might be considered prophetic - He is the One who has been intimately with the Father "in" the Beginning, who "exegetes" the Father, who speaks only the Father's words, and does everything the Father does in like manner.

Could you please tell me whether the anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in the following verses are indefinite or adjectival, in your view: Mark 2:28 (kurios estin); John 1:14 (sarx egeneto); John 3:6(sarx estin; pneuma estin); John 6:63(pneuma estin; zwe estin).

PROFESSOR: I seem to recall that you maintained the importance of distinguishing "class" from "nature." But Greek has no specific grammatical form for conveying something as tightly defined as "nature." Instead, what you have is a choice between individual and class.

ROBERT: Harner and others have written that a qualitatitve noun attributes the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of the noun to the subject. I'm not sure how one could define "nature" without saying that it is the sum total of a being's qualities, attributes, and characteristics. If one of the characteristics of ho theos is self-existence, is that not part of His nature? Isn't that one of the attributes of the true God that distinguishes Him as categorically distinct from other so-called gods in the Bible? Doesn't that make the true God's nature unique?

PROFESSOR: You are absolutely correct that reading theos in John 1:1c as individual yields a kind of modalism, conflates God and Word indistinguishably. But that is precisely what is conveyed by the traditional English translation in the absence of any sort of commentary or explanation.

ROBERT: Actually, I think the English word Deity works a bit better, in that we are more accustomed to seeing it used qualitatively: "The Word was with the Deity and the Word was Deity." I prefer "Deity" to "divine" because it signifies all that makes God, God (or a god, a god), whereas "divine" can mean a mere god-like quality. Qualitative nouns - even those that may include some indefiniteness - attribute all the qualities or characteristics of the noun to the subject; at least, I have not found any that clearly attribute only some qualities or all qualities in lesser measure. But on the whole, I prefer the traditional translation to other alternatives - all require some sort of explanation, but I think the traditional rendering conveys more of the essential truth of what John was writing. Of course, I know you disagree...

PROFESSOR: I wouldn't be concerned with that problem if that is what John wrote. But in fact John was very careful to distinguish the individual definite God from the Word which is characterized as belonging to the god/deity/divine class.

ROBERT: Again, I don't see the grammatical necessity for a indefinite semantic force. John, it seems to me, is saying much more than the Logos is a member of a "divine class." I think Harner's study is helpful, here. We should consider why John wrote 'theos hn ho logos' and not 'ho logos hn theos,' or 'ho logos hn theios.' The first would have been unambiguously indefinite; the second clearly adjectival. Why did John write what he did, and not one of these alternatives? The stairstep construction in John 1:1 places emphasis on the repeated words: "...ho logos kai ho logos...ton theon kai theos... This device seems to me more than a poetic decoration - John is setting forth the theme of his Gospel: The Word - God. The stress John places on theos is, I think, more than the indefinite nuance can bear. John is saying more than the logos is a member of a class - he is stressing the qualities of the logos - for the logos is "in" the Beginning, intimately with ho theos. Through the logos, all things came into being, and not one thing came into being apart from Him. The Son is the "one and only" - he is unique, not merely the member of a class, but in a class by Himself. Throughout his Gospel, John will distinguish ho logos from ho theos, as you rightly say. But he will also define precisely how ho logos "theos is" as well.

PROFESSOR: Philosophically and theologically you can define that class ("sharing the same nature") and set limits to it (monotheism), but the language of John does not itself provide those philosophical and theological fine points in John 1:1. What John's language does provide is a reference to logos, which has philosophical and theological meaning in the time of John that we can draw on to better understand what he is conveying, and a careful presentation throughout the gospel that fills in some of the things we need to understand about the Word-become-flesh/Christ. That is what the reader should attend to.

ROBERT: Do you find that Trinitarian scholars who've written on the Gospel of John have not done so? I'd be interested to hear your opinion of Carson's commentary on John, or Ridderbos' or Beasley-Murray's.

PROFESSOR: My position is simply to let John present the material in the way and order it has been formulated in his mind by remaining true to the language he uses and translating it as directly as possible into corresponding English sentences. I don't consider that the Bible needs my help, or the help of any translator, to fill in what it somehow fails to say or to artificially restrict or qualify what it does say. If that position is so radical that it puts me outside the mainstream in my profession then maybe that mainstream should consider whether it is in the right place.

ROBERT: Well said. Though I have my presuppositions like everyone else, I strive also to let John say what he says. I suspect that everyone who has written on this subject - including Metzger and Colwell - would say the same as well. The fact that some have allowed their presuppositions to override clear thinking is a cautionary tale for all of us.

Kind regards,

Robert

Dear Robert,

Thank you for your thoughtful remarks on the problems of translation with regard to John 1:1. I will comment on a selected portion of what you wrote, to keep the dialogue from becoming too lengthy (you and I are both wordy guys).

ROBERT: I agree that he misunderstood the application of Colwell's rule (as did Colwell himself, and scads of other scholars). However, I'm not sure that I agree that his other reasons were on "the basis of theology." At least not entirely. If I recall correctly, he bases at least a portion of his conclusion on his understanding of John's theology. While Metzger's theology may color his understanding of John's to some degree, I think it's painting with too broad a brush to suggest that Metzger bases his conclusion (apart from Colwell) entirely on >his own theological preferences. Metzger, I'm sure, has drawn conclusions about John's christology based on the rest of John's Gospel and John's other works, and these conclusions certainly play a legitimate part in his displeasure with the NWT rendering. I believe you concur with this methodology, for you say: "What John's language does provide is a reference to logos, which has philosophical and theological meaning in the time of John that we can draw on to better understand what he is conveying, and a careful presentation throughout the gospel that fills in some of the things we need to understand about the Word-become-flesh/Christ. That is what the reader should attend to." Since you are not engaging in theology when you attend to these matters in John's Gospel, I don't think its quite fair to accuse Metzger of doing so.

JB: Certainly Metzger believes that how he reads John 1:1 corresponds to what John's overall view is. Metzger also believes that his own personal beliefs correspond to John's overall view and to that of all "orthodox" Christianity. It's that combination of assumed correspondences that puts pressure on Metzger's reading of any one verse. Am I being unfair, not giving him the benefit of the doubt? I read Metzger as I would any text, and I can see in his heightened rhetoric his "displeasure," as you put it, his response to an affront to his own beliefs. He does not offer any substantive contextual reading to back up his interpretation/translation of John 1:1.

I simply don't share Metzger's set of assumptions that everything will line up comfortably between the Bible and a particular form of modern Christianity. As a historian I am aware of how much our society, culture, language, etc. differs from those of the people who wrote the Bible, and as a student of the Bible I am prepared to have it surprise and inform me . . . still.

Yes, literary context matters in helping to narrow down what an author could possibly mean in a given passage. Language is inherently ambiguous, and translation and interpretation struggle with that. The point I am trying to make about John is that he is BUILDING an argument, or presentation, about Christ in his gospel. What precisely, theologically, that argument and presentation is can be debated to some degree. But in terms of translation, you cannot legitimately pack the whole of that presentation into any one passage, verse, or word. You must let the presentation unfold in the course of the gospel. John 20:28 is a climax John has worked very hard to prepare the reader for, by spelling out in a variety of ways throughout the gospel in what way it can be true that Jesus is Thomas' "Lord and God." The gospel is all about stretching monotheism to accommodate the intimacy of identity between Christ and God the Father. It is a gross oversimplification of John's elaborate and delicate task in doing this to translate John 1:1c in the traditional manner. It is not what John wrote and it misses the point of what he wrote.

ROBERT: I agree that Colwell's Rule is of no value in determining the proper translation of John 1:1c, and that Colwell himself was mistaken when he used it to do so. However, I think you're overstating the case that his Rule "as formulated" is "a completely imaginary rule of Greek Grammar." His rule reads: "Definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article" (Colwell, p. 20). This rule, as stated, is, I believe, fairly well substantiated. That is, if one begins with nouns in the semantic category "definite" and examines their occurance in pre- and post-copulative constructions, it is not hard to demonstrate that "usually" definite nouns in pre-copulative constructions are anarthrous.

JB: The problem, you see, is that the methodology of this study, and of the studies that follow it, is unsound. It starts with nouns already determined to be definite. How was that determination made? How could it be made? Validly, the determination of a noun as definite must be made by grammatical signs. Colwell made his predetermination of definite nouns on purely subjective grounds, of nouns that "must" be definite because of what he thought they mean. It can be shown that in nearly every example of anarthrous pre-copulative nouns Colwell cites, he is mistaken about their definiteness.

But we agree that even if Colwell's Rule were valid, it does not help us with John 1:1c. So I will move on.

JB: You are right that everyone has biases. The critical thing is which biases operate when and with what self-awareness. Yet you have missed "something fundamental" which most people usually miss, and that is the training of someone like myself in the field of religious studies. You see, I teach at a state university. Teaching religion at a state institution requires the cultivation of objectivity and neutrality, or what we in the field call "bracketing." That is, we learn and strive to bracket our personal beliefs when engaged in our professional work, in the classroom and in research. When we fall short, others are there to point it out to us. It's very important to do this because, in the US, religion can only be taught in state institutions if it is handled in this neutral way. That's the law, but more importantly it is absolutely essential to our religious freedom. But, to stick to the point, I "bracket." But I don't expect you to take my word for it. If in my arguments you detect a bias at work in defiance of the grammatical, literary, and historical/cultural facts, come down on me as hard as you can.

ROBERT: At this point, I'm unwilling to concede that the rules and properties of Greek grammar mandate an indefinite semantic force for theos in John 1:1c.

JB: Then you must have a grammatical argument to make for the definite semantic force. I take it that the following is your argument, and will respond accordingly.

ROBERT: Perhaps we should more clearly define our terms. If you ask mewhat grade my daughter is in, I'll answer "She a second-grader." From my understanding, this would be a classic indefinite usage. I'm saying that she is in the "class" or category of children in the second grade. However, if you ask me if I'm going to take my >daughter to see the film The Lord of the Rings, I might answer, "No, she's just a second-grader." Here, my meaning is not that my daughter is a member of a class - but rather that she has the qualities or characteristics of second-graders - that is, she's too young to appreciate the film. This is a qualitative usage. In English, we often use the indefinite article to signify qualitativeness, but not always. Some nouns lend themselves more to a qualitative usage without the article - "man," for instance. If I say to an evolutionist, "Homo Erectus was man," I'm not saying that our ancient ancestor was "a man," (a member of a class or category), nor that he is The Man (definite); instead, I mean that he was fully human - possessing all the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of humanity. Greek grammarians since Robertson (and even some before) have demonstrated that anarthrous nouns in Greek often lay stress on the qualities or characteristics of the noun. The question, then, as you note, is how best to translate this semantic nuance into English. In many occasions, it will have to be with the indefinite article - since English idiom restricts us. In other cases, we may choose an adjective (for example, I think "sinful" works better than "a sinner" for hamartwlos in John 9:24, 25). In some cases, the noun may simply be rendered without either the definite or indefinite article (which is how most translators render kurios in Mark 2:28). The translator must determine what semantic force is predominant (indefiniteness or qualitativeness) and then decide the best English equivalent.

JB: The semantic distinction between quality and category is not made in Greek GRAMMAR. In other words, Greek writers do not write differently for qualitative meaning than they do for categorical meaning. For them, category and quality are the same. We can argue over the exact nuance of a phrase, over its semantic stress, certainly. But the language does not carry in itself anything that allows us to settle the argument definitively. On the other hand, it carries enough information to permit us to define the semantic RANGE of a phrase, what is possible and what is impossible, what conveys what the language carries and what steps beyond that. Your argument above would support, at most, a translation of "the Word was god," using "god" as a common noun denoting a category of being, just as "man" in your example. Of course, to translate that way results in exactly the same meaning, the same semantic force, as "the Word was a god." For John, as for Greek writers generally, membership in a category carries with it (at least some, if not always all) the qualities of that category.

ROBERT: I would argue that Greek conveys quality with a qualitative noun. If one accepts qualitativeness as a semantic nuance, I don't see how it's possible to convey that nuance with an indefinite noun (which has an entirely different semantic nuance). In Greek, that is. While we may, in some cases, translate a qualitative noun with an indefinite noun in English, we must, I think, argue from sense, not translation. Either the author intends to convey the qualities of his subject, or he intends to place that subject in a class or category. And while members of a class or category have the attributes associated with that class, that is an extra-linguistic deduction. The author (unless intending ambiguity) places emphasis on one or the other. He or she intends a specific meaning in using a qualitative construction. When the lady at the well calls Jesus "a prophet," she is not merely placing Him in a category of other prophets, but rather is emphasizing Jesus' prophetic attributes that enabled Him intimately to know about her past. Her emphasis is on the qualities of "prophet," not on membership in the class or category of prophets.

JB: We agree on the point that by placing someone or something in a category, ancient Greek endows that person or thing with the qualities and attributes of that category generally speaking. That is part of the IMPLICIT MEANING in such a usage. But there is no "qualitative noun" in Greek GRAMMAR. "Quality" is a matter of interpreted semantic stress in a usage of a noun in one of its forms, in the case of John 1:1c, an indefinite form. The author may well intend stress one way or another, but we only know the author's "intention" based upon signs in his use of grammar and syntax. What's not there can only be guessed at. Harner may well be right that a certain pattern of placement of anarthrous nouns is such a sign of stress on quality. That would yield a translation of "the Word was a divine being" or, a bit looser, "the Word was divine." Is there something conveyed in such translations that is not conveyed by "the Word was a god" or "the Word was god"?

ROBERT:I agree that quality can be conveyed with an adjective, but I think an adjectival sense often is less than is intended by a qualitative noun. The lady at the well is, I think, saying more than Jesus is "prophetic." She is saying that He has all the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of a prophet in full measure.

JB: Now how do you know this, Robert? What is there in the language on the page that gives you this? Isn't it because this is Jesus she is talking about that you read into the words more content, more significance, than you would if she was talking about some other "prophet." John's a good enough writer that if he wants to communicate that information, he can quite clearly. John frequently uses irony in such statements by others, and I would contend that "prophet" has a very thin, inadequate meaning in the woman's mouth in this passage, one that Jesus repeatedly outshines in the gospel.

ROBERT: Indeed, though the lady does not know this (but John certainly does), Jesus more completely embodies the qualities of "prophet" than does anyone in the OT that might be considered prophetic - He is the One who has been intimately with the Father "in" the Beginning, who "exegetes" the Father, who speaks only the Father's words, and does everything the Father does in like manner.

JB: Yes, and what you have done is paraphrase OTHER verses where these things are stated. But these very things are NOT in the word "prophet" spoken by the Samaritan woman. This is precisely what I mean by "reading in" -- as seems to be happening with John 1:1, although you haven't actually declared your translation of it yet, so I don't want to pre-judge.

ROBERT: Could you please tell me whether the anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in the following verses are indefinite or adjectival, in your view: Mark 2:28 (kurios estin); John 1:14 (sarx egeneto); John 3:6(sarx estin; pneuma estin); John 6:63(pneuma estin; zwe estin).

JB: I don't think the choice between indefinite and adjectival works for you here. Don't you want it to be between indefinite and qualitative? or categorical and qualitative?

Mark 2:28: "So the Son of Man is lord (or a lord) also (or even) of the sabbath." He has the status of lord, master. He is not "lordly" or "masterly" -- these adjectives don't work here. He belongs to the class of beings that have mastery over the (rules of the) sabbath. He does not have the "nature" or "qualities" of a master -- he has the authority of one.

John 1:14: "And the Word became flesh." "Flesh" (sarx) is an indefinite noun of substance, just as we would say, "The jar is pewter." So it doesn't take the indefinite noun in English. "Fleshly" could work as an adjective here, although some would object that the connotation would be wrong applied to Christ. The fact is that John is not stressing "fleshly" in that moral sense, but the material substance. But there are ramifications of that material substance that are negative for John -- most importantly, it is vulnerable and mortal. The Word takes on or becomes the substance, and so the qualities and attributes of flesh, certainly. The Word becomes something in the "flesh" category.

John 3:6: "That which is born of flesh is flesh." Excellent example of two indefinite nouns, indistinguishable grammatically, that convey what I have been saying about category and quality. In short, category defines qualities. Belonging to the flesh category means that one has flesh qualities. You could get away with "fleshly" for the second sarx, but it hardly seems necessary. The same remarks hold true for "spirit" (pneuma).

John 6:63: "The words that I have spoken are spirit and life." In the context, Jesus has talked about the "spirit" as the life-force that animates flesh into a living being. Now he identifies his teachings metaphorically with this imagery of spirit and life. "Spiritual" and "living" doesn't quite get at the direct analogy he is making.

ROBERT: Harner and others have written that a qualitative noun attributes the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of the noun to the subject. I'm not sure how one could define "nature" without saying that it is the sum total of a being's qualities, attributes, and characteristics. If one of the characteristics of ho theos is self-existence, is that not part of His nature? Isn't that one of the attributes of the true God that distinguishes Him as categorically distinct from other so-called gods in the Bible? Doesn't that make the true God's nature unique?

JB: But how do you know what John includes in the list of qualities and attributes he intends in this particular verse by the category theos? Does he spell that out sufficiently in the subsequent pages of his gospel? How much should we bring in the common or philosophical views of theos John would have assumed in his readers? To keep from being totally circular in our reasoning, and from reading into the text everything we might want to be there, we have to ask ourselves self-disciplining questions such as these. Put the shoe on the other foot: when John says that "the Word became flesh" does he mean that Christ has "the sum total" of the qualities, attributes, and characteristics of "flesh" as those are spelled out in the Bible, including lust, selfishness, warring against the spirit, etc.? Or when Jesus himself says that he is the vine, does he mean he has the sum total of a vine's characteristics, including leaves and juice? Or when he says that he is the son of God, does that mean that he has all of the characteristics of a son, including genetic material of the father? Categories are flexible, and the qualities associated with a category vary with use.

ROBERT: Actually, I think the English word Deity works a bit better, in that we are more accustomed to seeing it used qualitatively: "The Word was with the Deity and the Word was Deity." I prefer "Deity" to "divine" because it signifies all that makes God, God (or a god, a god), whereas "divine" can mean a mere god-like quality. Qualitative nouns - even those that may include some indefiniteness - attribute all the qualities or characteristics of the noun to the subject; at least, I have not found any that clearly attribute only some qualities or all qualities in lesser measure. But on the whole, I prefer the traditional translation to other alternatives - all require some sort of explanation, but I think the traditonal rendering conveys more of the essential truth of what John was writing. Of course, I know you disagree...

JB: Yes, I do disagree, because the traditional translation inadvertently makes an individual identification that John does not intend (because he shows he does not intend it by writing theos differently in John 1:1c than he does in 1:1b). "Deity" is a bit awkward, I think, but so is "a god." But you cannot legitimately capitalize "Deity" because it is not used as a name. And by using "Deity" also in John 1:1b you commit the same mistake of individual identification that the traditional translation makes.

With all due respect, I think you are simply overlooking very common uses of "qualitative" nouns (meaning indefinites) where all the attributes are not carried over to the subject. After all, metaphor and simile could not possibly work in a language such as the one you imagine. One of the most famous lines from the Bible -- "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" -- is translated thus from the original "All is vapor." Now the passage does not mean that all things have the entire sum of qualities of vapor or mist. Rather, the passage highlights a particular quality of vapor/mist -- that it quickly evaporates without a trace -- that everything is said to have. When Pilate asks "Am I a Jew?" He is not asking, "Am I circumcised? Do I pray at set times of the day? Do I observe the sabbath?" etc. -- all the attributes of Jewishness. He means simply, "Do I belong to the category of persons for whom what you are saying would have some meaning?"

JB: I agree, and have always maintained, that there is room within the semantic range of what John has written for it to be either adjectival or nominal, because I know that category and quality fall within the same grammatical construction in Greek. You prefer an adjectival rendering -- that preference does not rule out other renderings. Yes, it is useful to compare what John wrote to what he could have written. Such a comparison clearly shows that John didn't mean "the Word was God" because there are at least two other ways to write John 1:1c that could only be read that way, and John didn't use them. It is also true that there is at least one other way John could have written 1:1c that could only be read as "the Word was a god," and he didn't use it either. There are also several ways John could have written 1:1c with an adjective, that could only be read as "the Word was divine," but he didn't. So what we are left with is phrasing that could be adjectival or nominal, and we have no way to prove it one way or the other. I agree that the chiasmic repetition of "theos" and "logos" is deliberate and significant, as well as poetic. But what you seem to gloss over in mentioning that pattern is that it is slightly broken, in that John drops the article with second "theos." Now in ancient Greek when you set up a parallelism and break the parallel in one place, you are drawing attention to that break (Paul does this all the time). So John is being very careful here to mark the nuance he is trying to convey in John 1:1c: the Word was with HO THEOS, and the Word was THEOS. What is the significance of that distinction? What is John getting at? The answer is open to interpretation, and the translator's job is not to foreclose and predetermine interpretation, but to convey John's phrasing as openly as John left it.

JB: I think modern scholarship has handled what we know about the ancient concept of Logos very poorly when it comes to applying it to biblical interpretation. But I may have missed something.

ROBERT: Though I have my presuppositions like everyone else, I strive also to let John say what he says. I suspect that everyone who has written on this subject - including Metzger and Colwell - would say the same as well. The fact that some have allowed their presuppositions to override clear thinking is a cautionary tale for all of us.

JB: Indeed it is.

best wishes,
Jason BeDuhn

Dr. BeDuhn,

Thanks for taking the time to answer my post so thoroughly. I'll take some time to ponder what you've written and will get back to you in a day or two.

I'm really enjoying our dialog thus far - it's a pleasure to interact with someone who is both knowledgeable and cordial - and who challenges me to think through my views.

Best regards,

Robert

Hello, Dr. BeDuhn,

Thanks again for your time on this topic. As you did, I'll try to condense things a bit by responding in depth to what I think are your key comments.

I think we've covered Metzger pretty thoroughly. We agree on some points and disagree on others. Not a bad start!

With regard to Colwell, you wrote: "It can be shown that in nearly every example of anarthrous pre-copulative nouns Colwell cites, he is mistaken about their definiteness." I wasn't aware of this fact. I quoted two articles and one grammar that substantiated his rule "as formulated." While Colwell's methodology can be characterized as "subjective," that does not necessarily invalidate his results. I don't think one can fault McGaughy's methodology on the same grounds, nor Hartley's. Can you please point me to studies that have demonstrated that his rule is invalid, or provide your own statistics that do so?

You went on to say:

JB: The point I am trying to make about John is that he is BUILDING an argument, or presentation, about Christ in his gospel. What precisely, theologically, that argument and presentation is can be debated to some degree. But in terms of translation, you cannot legitimately pack the whole of that presentation into any one passage, verse, or word. You must let the presentation unfold in the course of the gospel. John 20:28 is a climax John has worked very hard to prepare the reader for, by spelling out in a variety of ways throughout the gospel in what way it can be true that Jesus is Thomas' "Lord and God." The gospel is all about stretching monotheism to accommodate the intimacy of identity between Christ and God the Father. It is a gross oversimplification of John's elaborate and delicate task in doing this to translate John 1:1c in the traditional manner. It is not what John wrote and it misses the point of what he wrote.

ROBERT: In general, I agree with your assessment that John is building an argument that stretches monotheism to accommodate Jesus - I would say - in the identity of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. I'm pleased to see that you view John 20:28 as the climax of John's Gospel and therefore key to understanding John's christology. Placing Thomas' confession at the climax of his Gospel, John would seem to preclude the possibility of the NWT's indefinite rendering of John 1:1c, unless we believe that John's christology was essentially ditheistic (that is, that a second god may be included in the devotional praxis of believers). If we understand the traditional rendering in the way proposed by countless orthodox commentators and grammarians - that the Logos has the qualities, attributes, or characteristics of theos - I don't think this in any way is a "gross simplification." Thomas' confession is then placed in a proper context, in which his God has not changed from YHWH to a second god (in direct violation of the Law), but to Jesus, who is essentially One with the Father - the ultimate fulfilment of the Law.

ROBERT: Fair enough. I would just point out that I am - to some extent - a product of our state college system (I got my undergraduate degree from California State University, Northridge), and as a student, I saw very little 'bracketing' from my professors. The English department, in which I studied, was rife with anti-Christian thought, and it was thinly veiled in the classroom, if at all. I recall one professor in particular ridiculing me in front of the entire class, more or less as follows: "I think Hommel is a born-again Christian and, frankly, I don't think such people have much of interest to offer to this discussion." This was in a "Bible as Literature" course. The entire experience at state college broke me of the naive, cultural Christianity I grew up with. I came to believe that anyone who was a Christian was simply not thinking clearly. So, while I appreciate the effort you're making to 'bracket,' I do remain skeptical that anyone is completely unaffected by his or her presuppositions.

JB: Then you must have a grammatical argument to make for the definite semantic force. I take it that the following is your argument, and will respond accordingly.

ROBERT: I do not think the only choices are definite or indefinite. More on this, below

ROBERT: A Greek writer can express the indefinite force in copulative sentences unambiguously by placing the noun after the verb and dropping the article. The fact that he can also place the anarthrous noun prior to the verb, and when doing so, the result - more often than not - lays stress on the quality of the noun - seems to me a rather clear GRAMMATICAL distinction. We agree - at least I hope we do - that such nouns can also - in some cases - convey a definite semantic nuance (that is, be semantically equivalent to having the article). Thus, we cannot assume that simply because the noun is anarthrous that it must be indefinite. And in clear cases where quality is stressed (we'll discuss some of those, below), the semantic force is far from indefinite (membership in a class), and must be preserved in translation, as much as possible, without adding ambiguity with an indefinite rendering, if such did not exist in the target language.

In the English example I provided, I don't believe that "man" denotes a category of being. I am not saying that homo erectus is a category of being. "Man" certainly contains within its semantic range the idea of a category of men (a generic sense); but in the sentence I wrote, that category is not the referent of "man." Nor am I saying that he is a member of a category of being - that would be an indefinite semantic force - "homo erectus was a man." I am using "man" in a qualitative sense to mean that he possesses all the attributes or characteristics of humanity. I'm arguing from the sense I intend by writing that sentence the way I did - not what may be deduced from it. We may deduce that having the qualities of "man," homo erectus was also in a class or category of "man," but you'll notice that we have to indefinitize the noun grammatically to unambiguously express this idea. The GRAMMAR stipulates only that the qualities are attributed to the subject ("Homo Erectus is man" not "is a member of the category of man").

ROBERT: We're agreed that indefiniteness places a person or thing in a class or category. We're also agreed that indefiniteness implies that the attributes associated with the class are possessed by the member, at least to some degree. But I don't agree that there is no qualitative noun in Greek grammar. There are quite a few Greek scholars that do not agree with you on this point, either. I'm not making an appeal to authority, here - just pointing out that I'm not out on a limb on this one. If we accept as given that a non-definite noun may express two meanings - membership or qualities - it seems obvious that in any given context, a writer may be stressing one or the other. It's possible, as some have argued, that the writer may be equally stressing both, but I tend to think that writers have one specific semantic force in mind, and our inability, at times, to discern which force is intended is an artifact of the inherent ambiguity of language. I find Harner convincing that when the author intends to stress quality, he places the anarthrous noun prior to the copula. In such cases, I believe considering the noun qualitative more accurately reflects the author's meaning. I would never argue that John 1:1 (or any other disputed verse) proves that the semantic category of qualitativeness exists. Other semantic forces are possible in such a construction. However, I think there are rather clear examples of qualitative usage elsewhere, and quite a few of them. So, while I understand your view that qualitative = indefinite, I think this approach to semantics does not provide an adequate way to express the author's meaning.

JB: I don't think the choice between indefinite and adjectival works for you here. Don't you want it to be between indefinite and qualitative? or categorical and qualitative?

ROBERT: No, not really. You had stated that a Greek writer stresses quality by using either an indefinite noun or adjective. I was interested in obtaining your view on the following verses, which I take to be fairly clear examples of qualitative usage:

JB: Mark 2:28: "So the Son of Man is lord (or a lord) also (or even) of the sabbath." He has the status of lord, master. He is not "lordly" or "masterly" -- these adjectives don't work here. He belongs to the class of beings that have mastery over the (rules of the) sabbath. He does not have the "nature" or "qualities" of a master -- he has the authority of one.

ROBERT: So you see kurios as purely indefinite, here? This is one of the key verses that Harner uses to establish the qualitative nuance in his article. What do you find lacking in his logic regarding this verse? Do you think the Jews believed that there was a "class of beings that have mastery over the sabbath?" Or was Jesus introducing the concept? What beings would be in this class? From my perspective, if quality is not being stressed (as I believe it is), kurios is far more likely to be definite ("the Lord of the Sabbath") than indefinite. Indeed, Harner writes that qualitative nouns "may also have some connotation of definiteness" (Harner, p. 87).

JB: John 1:14: "And the Word became flesh." "Flesh" (sarx) is an indefinite noun of substance, just as we would say, "The jar is pewter." So it doesn't take the indefinite noun in English. "Fleshly" could work as an adjective here, although some would object that the connotation would be wrong applied to Christ. The fact is that John is not stressing "fleshly" in that moral sense, but the material substance. But there are ramifications of that material substance that are negative for John -- most importantly, it is vulnerable and mortal. The Word takes on or becomes the substance, and so the qualities and attributes of flesh, certainly. The Word becomes something in the "flesh" category.

ROBERT: OK. I'm beginning to understand why you say quality is expressed only with indefinite nouns or adjectives. In addition to denying qualitative nouns, you are including more nouns in the indefinite category than I would. This is a good example. Nouns of substance, like "Pewter" and "flesh," would generally be termed "mass" or "non-count" nouns. Non-count nouns cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized. I think Jespersen makes this fairly clear, as do a number of other linguists. If I say "the jar is pewter," I'm not saying the jar is a member of the pewter category, but rather that the jar is made out of pewter. Thus, the Word is made flesh. The qualitative force of mass nouns seems straightforward to me.

You seem to be using "indefinite" in a more general way, as a noun that does not refer to a specific person, place, or thing. In that sense, I suppose I'd consider sarx indefinite, too - or at least non-definite - but you also argue strongly that the indefinite semantic force places the subject in a class or category, and I concur. But, I simply don't see such a meaning as being possible with non-count nouns. It would have been easy enough for John to have written, "ho logos egeneto anqrwpos," had he wished to stress the Word's membership in a class or category. It seems John wished to say something other than that. The equative verb attributes "flesh" to ho logos; it does not equate ho logos with "a" member of a class. When someone equates a subject with a non-count noun, it seems to me that a qualitative force more naturally reflects the intended meaning. As you have said, "the qualities and attributes of flesh, certainly."

JB: John 3:6: "That which is born of flesh is flesh." Excellent example of two indefinite nouns, indistinguishable grammatically, that convey what I have been saying about category and quality. In short, category defines qualities. Belonging to the flesh category means that one has flesh qualities. You could get away with "fleshly" for the second sarx, but it hardly seems necessary. The same remarks hold true for "spirit" (pneuma).

ROBERT: If sarx is a non-count noun in Greek as it is in English, I don't see it as being indefinite in the sense of being a class or category. Again, it seems forced to say that Jesus is placing that which is born of the flesh in the "flesh category." Rather, it seems to me that - just as in John 1:1 - there is an interplay between the same noun used with and without the article - between definite and qualitative: "that which is born of the flesh is (by nature) flesh." At least, I take this to be the essential meaning of what Jesus is saying.

Pneuma is, of course, a count noun. Thus, grammatically, it is distinguishable from sarx, at least in this sense. I agree that the count noun in this verse takes on the same semantic force as the non-count noun does - the parallelism virtually demands it. However, since a non-count noun does not denote membership in a class or category, we are left with qualitative in both cases.

JB: John 6:63: "The words that I have spoken are spirit and life." In the context, Jesus has talked about the "spirit" as the life-force that animates flesh into a living being. Now he identifies his teachings metaphorically with this imagery of spirit and life. "Spiritual" and "living" doesn't quite get at the direct analogy he is making.

ROBERT: If these nouns are not adjectival, they must be indefinite in your view, correct? If so, do you see Jesus' meaning as being that his words are metaphorically in a class of spirits and the category of life? Isn't it more natural to understand him as meaning that his words have the qualities of (life-giving) spirit and (eternal) life?

ROBERT: You were, I think, telling me that Greek grammar cannot convey something as tightly defined as "nature." I was pointing out that the very definition that Harner and others have given to "qualitative" points to nature. Harner makes this same connection, though I'm sure you don't agree with him on this point.

Since I don't view theos in this verse as an indefinite noun, I don't see it as a category. I see it as having the exact same semantic force as sarx in John 1:14 - as you do. But I think the qualitative force more accurately reflects John's meaning in both cases. The Word had the attributes of theos. The Word assumed the attributes of flesh. To the extent that He became flesh, he was theos.

JB: Put the shoe on the other foot: when John says that "the Word became flesh" does he mean that Christ has "the sum total" of the qualities, attributes, and characteristics of "flesh" as those are spelled out in the Bible, including lust, selfishness, warring against the spirit, etc.?

ROBERT: I don't think we can exclude any qualities of flesh being attributed to the Son in John 1:14. The grammar points to the Son becoming 100% human. This is, of course, how most commentators and grammarians view this verse. Jesus was not almost human or human in part or human in a lesser degree. He was completely, 100% human. Other verses, of course, qualify this revelation about the Son so that we know He was entirely human in all but sin.

JB: Or when Jesus himself says that he is the vine, does he mean he has the sum total of a vine's characteristics, including leaves and juice? Or when he says that he is the son of God, does that mean that he has all of the characteristics of a son, including genetic material of the father? Categories are flexible, and the qualities associated with a category vary with use.

ROBERT: I don't believe Jesus calls himself the vine or the Son by using a qualitative noun, but I may be mistaken. If he does, we should not press metaphoric language, as I'm sure you'll agree.

ROBERT: Again, I think any translation of John 1:1c will require some explanation. The traditional understanding is, of course, that the lack of the article signifies that the qualities of the Word, not his person, are in view.

JB: "Deity" is a bit awkward, I think, but so is "a god." But you cannot legitimately capitalize "Deity" because it is not used as name. And by using "Deity" also in John 1:1b you commit the same mistake of individual identification that the traditional translation makes.

ROBERT: I don't think so - the use of the definite article "the Deity" signifies a certain person is in view; the anarthrous use ("Deity") does not signify the person, but the qualities of Deity. I won't quibble about the capital, other than to say that nouns may be capitalized for emphasis, not merely to signify a proper name.

JB: With all due respect, I think you are simply overlooking very common uses of "qualitative" nouns (meaning indefinites) where all the attributes are not carried over to the subject. After all, metaphor and simile could not possibly work in a language such as the one you imagine.

ROBERT: Well, I hope I'm not being quite that obtuse, but one is often blind to one's own faults! Yes, I recognize the use of metaphor and simile - as I do paradox and hyperbole and other figures of speech. I don't regard John 1:1 as simile or metaphor. I would not rule out paradox completely, but don't advocate that view.

I think nouns with qualitative-indefinite or indefinite semantic forces can carry the sense to which you're referring. The predominant sense imparted by a qualitative noun is to attribute the qualities of the PN in full measure to the subject; at least I'm unaware of any counter-examples. It's possible there are some exceptions, and I'd like to learn of them if you know of any. But I think the "full measure" connotation is well established: When we read that God is spirit, or God is love, I don't think it's reasonable to conclude that there are some qualities of spirit lacking in God, or that He does not have all the qualities of love.

JB: One of the most famous lines from the Bible -- "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" -- is translated thus from the original "All is vapor." Now the passage does not mean that all things have the entire sum of qualities of vapor or mist. Rather, the passage highlights a particular quality of vapor/mist -- that it quickly evaporates without a trace -- that everything is said to have.

ROBERT: I see exactly what you're saying, and I agree that not all the qualities of "vapor" are applied to "all things," but this is not an example of a pre-verbal anarthrous PN construction, at least not in the Greek of the LXX.

JB: When Pilate asks "Am I a Jew?" He is not asking, "Am I circumcised? Do I pray at set times of the day? Do I observe the sabbath?" etc. -- all the attributes of Jewishness. He means simply, "Do I belong to the category of persons for whom what you are saying would have some meaning?"

ROBERT: This is an interesting example. I'll have to give this one some further thought, but my initial reaction is that the 'mhti' at the beginning of the verse inverts the qualitative force - "I not Jewish, am I?" meaning, "I don't have any qualities of a Jew, do I?

ROBERT: As I hope I've clarified, I don't prefer the adjectival rendering. When an adjectival form for a noun exists - as it does with theos/theios - we must ask if the substantive used qualitatively is synonymous with the adjectival form. We must ask if there are examples of it modifying a substantive as an adjective elsewhere in our literature. Hamartwlos does not have distinct forms of substantive and adjective, and does modify other nouns, which is why (as I have previously stated) I think an adjectival rendering may be appropriate in some contexts. But this is not the case with theos.

JB: Yes, it is useful to compare what John wrote to what he could have written. Such a comparison clearly shows that John didn't mean "the Word was God" because there are at least two other ways to write John 1:1c that could only be read that way, and John didn't use them.

ROBERT: Those other ways would make theos definite, wouldn't they? I agree, John probably did not intend a definite semantic force. But if John intended to stress quality, and wanted to distinguish the qualitative force from an indefinite one, he would have written John 1:1c just as he did. At least, this is Harner's conclusion and it seems to be accepted by most Greek scholars since him who've written on the subject.

JB: It is also true that there is at least one other way John could have written 1:1c that could only be read as "the Word was a god," and he didn't use it either. There are also several ways John could have written 1:1c with an adjective, that could only be read as "the Word was divine," but he didn't. So what we are left with is phrasing that could be adjectival or nominal, and we have no way to prove it one way or the other.

ROBERT: We have no way to prove it from grammar alone, I agree. We do, though, have John telling us things about the Logos in John 1:1a, 1:1b, and 1:3 that should limit what John could mean, though, as you have noted. As Barr has demonstrated, "meaning" is expressed in larger chunks of discourse than a word or phrase or even a sentence. It is, I think, the translator's burden to attempt to ascertain John's meaning as best he or she can by careful consideration of these larger chunks, rather than acquiescing to grammatical possibilities.

JB: I agree that the chiasmic repetition of "theos" and "logos" is deliberate and significant, as well as poetic. But what you seem to gloss over in mentioning that pattern is that it is slightly broken, in that John drops the article with second "theos." Now in ancient Greek when you set up a parallelism and break the parallel in one place, you are drawing attention to that break (Paul does this all the time). So John is being very careful here to mark the nuance he is trying to convey in John 1:1c: the Word was with HO THEOS, and the Word was THEOS. What is the significance of that distinction? What is John getting at? The answer is open to interpretation, and the translator's job is not to foreclose and predetermine interpretation, but to convey John's phrasing as openly as John left it.

ROBERT: I agree that John emphasizes the distinction between ho theos and ho logos. But I think you're overstating the case a bit on the significance of broken chiasmus. There are examples of perfect chaismus in the NT, such as Mat 13:15. And there are examples where the breaks are exegetically significant (Eph 6:5-7). But even in the larger stairstep structure of the Matthew passage, there are minor breaks in the parallelism ("prophecy of Isaiah" v. 14; "prophets and righteous men" v. 17) that do not seem to be there for emphasis, but rather are simply sytlistic variations that do not affect the overall chiastic structure. My impression is that chiasmus in the NT is generally not perfect - near parallels are often used instead of exact ones, with no intended emphasis. But perhaps I'm mistaken - I cannot claim to have studied chiasmus extensively.

John is certainly emphasizing theos in 1:1c, both by the slightly broken chiasmus and by placing theos at the head of its clause. Yes, the absence of the article is vital to a proper understanding of John 1:1, but that does not negate the emphasis on theos itself. If John wishes to place an emphasis on the anarthrous theos, is that emphasis intended to diminish the Logos as theos in comparison to ho theos, or is it intended to elevate the Logos to the level of ho theos? I think we agree that it is the latter - theos is EMPHASIZED. This would be consistent with the exalted status the Son is given throughout the Prologue and the Gospel as a whole. Does this not argue against the Logos as "a god?" And, if you wish to understand theos as an adjective, can you please show me where a noun is paralleled in the climax of a chiastic pattern by exhibiting an adjectival force?

Kind regards,

Robert Hommel

Dear Robert,
Thank you for your latest set of thoughtful remarks and questions on the issues surrounding the translation of John 1:1c. I want to focus on a few key points that I think hold the most promise for reaching clarity in this discussion. I think we have already made substantial progress in that direction, and I want to stay on track.

(1) COLWELL
So, we set aside Metzger and all those who, like Metzger misuse Colwell. We can also set aside Colwell, because you and I agree that, even if he is right, his "rule" cannot settle the translation of John 1:1c. The fact is, though, that Colwell is not right. His own article contains data that shows so many exceptions to his "rule" (that is, fifteen definite nouns that DO HAVE the article even though they are before the verb) that no one should have taken his claims seriously. His predetermination of definiteness made his whole study circular from the start. You say:

ROBERT: We agree - at least I hope we do - that such nouns can also - in some cases - convey a definite semantic nuance (that is, be semantically equivalent to having the article). Thus, we cannot assume that simply because the noun is anarthrous that it must be indefinite.

JB: On the contrary, there are only a couple of examples in the whole NT where a definite semantic nuance appears necessary despite the lack of an article. But here we have to wonder, since the grammar does not indicate definiteness, whether we are importing definiteness from how we would say something in English. The best example of this is John 19:31 where English usage suggests a definite sense to "preparation day," which appears in this verse as an article-less predicate noun before the verb. Yet just a few verses earlier, in John 19:14, the same expression, "preparation day" appears as an article-less predicate noun AFTER the verb, where it must be indefinite. So we need to recognize the mismatch between how Greek uses indefinites and English does. You also say:

ROBERT: While Colwell's methodology can be characterized as "subjective," that does not necessarily invalidate his results.

JB: But on the contrary, the subjective basis of his determination of definiteness makes it interpretive rather than translational. How does he KNOW they are definite without some sort of objectively valid grammatical marker of definiteness? That's what I mean by circular, and that makes his claims invalid. But what does this have to do with John 1:1c? Just this point that I started to make above. When we see how exactly Colwell went wrong we learn something about a basic mistake we may be making when we translate. Colwell was often misled by how we would say something IN ENGLISH into thinking that in Greek it has definiteness. But Greek communicates meaning in different ways than English does. The very same problem afflicts appeals to "qualitative" vs. "indefinite" -- these are semantic distinctions we make in English, and that can be distinguished grammatically in English, but in Greek there is no grammatical distinction and therefore we cannot be sure there was a semantic distinction. The claim that there is a distinct "qualitative noun" in Greek is only a hypothesis, and cannot be proven because there is nothing in the grammar that conclusively shows such a distinct noun function. Ah, but what about Harner?

(2) HARNER: "QUALITATIVE" VS. "INDEFINITE"
Harner believes that he sees a trend in noun placement that points to a distinct semantic function, namely, that an article-less predicate noun before the verb conveys "quality." This is certainly not a "rule," because there are plenty of exceptions. That is, we have article-less predicate nouns before the verb that are clearly indefinite, rather than qualitative in meaning, for example:

John 9:16 "And there was a schism among them." "A schism," indefinite, not in any sense qualitative.

Mark 6:49 "It is a ghost." "A ghost" is used here to identify, not designate quality. The one quality is given in the narrative: what they see walks on water. From that one quality they conclude the identity, that is, the category to which what they see belongs: the ghost category. (Harner agrees, page 78).

1 Corinthians 8:4 "There is no god except one." "No god" with an article-less theos where a category, not a quality, is referred to, as clearly shown by the use of a enumerative expression, "no/none."

You add:

ROBERT: A Greek writer can express the indefinite force in copulative sentences unambiguously by placing the noun after the verb and dropping the article.

JB: But we also have article-less predicate nouns in after the verb that are every bit as much "qualitative" as Harner's nouns, such as in Mark 9:35; Luke 20:33; John 4:18; John 18:13; Acts 10:36; 2 Thessalonians 2:4. You go on:

ROBERT: The fact that he can also place the anarthrous noun prior to the verb, and when doing so, the result - more often than not - lays stress on the quality of the noun - seems to me a rather clear GRAMMATICAL distinction.

JB: This would be so if there was a grammatical rule. But there is no such rule, as the counter-examples demonstrate. We must be clear to our readers here that Harner and some others following him are ADVOCATING qualitativeness as a separate semantic category. But this has not been PROVEN to be true of Greek. Harner himself uses plenty of "may be"s in his article. I have looked at the very same evidence, and I contend that it shows that while indefiniteness and qualitativeness are distinct semantic categories in English, they are not in Greek. That mismatch means that there is room for variations in translation of sentences like John 1:1c. But there are also limits to how far your variation can go. When in comes to Greek grammar, the basic characteristic I learned in school and from the grammars is that word order is not significant grammatically, generally speaking. Greek has cases and relational particles that relieve word order of grammatical function. And so we see Greek writers arranging sentences in all sorts of orders.

Not that word order cannot serve some semantic function. Harner actually throws in, page 85, that "the word theos is placed at the beginning for emphasis." This has often been stated over the centuries, and Harner is saying nothing new. But it's a big problem for his thesis, because he can't have it both ways. Either John placed theos first to convey quality, or he placed it first for emphasis. It can't do both at the same time. Placing a word first in a sentence for emphasis is universally recognized as something that is done in Greek, whereas the "qualitative" function of such placement is still debatable. You say:

ROBERT: And in clear cases where quality is stressed (we'll discuss some of those, below), the semantic force is far from indefinite (membership in a class), and must be preserved in translation, as much as possible, without adding ambiguity with an indefinite rendering, if such did not exist in the target language.

JB: I very strenuously disagree with your statement that qualitative semantic force is "far" from indefinite semantic force. In Greek they are indistinguishable, as I have said. There may be some need to distinguish them in English (the target language), but always keeping in mind that this is a distinction not made in Greek (the source language). You also say:

ROBERT: In the English example I provided, I don't believe that "man" denotes a category of being. I am not saying that homo erectus is a category of being. "Man" certainly contains within its semantic range the idea of a category of men (a generic sense); but in the sentence I wrote, that category is not the referent of "man." Nor am I saying that he is a member of a category of being - that would be an indefinite semantic force - "homo erectus was a man." I am using "man" in a qualitative sense to mean that he possesses all the attributes or characteristics of humanity. I'm arguing from the sense I intend by writing that sentence the way I did - not what may be deduced from it.

JB: That's fine that you as the author can tell us what you intend. But we don't have John to tell us what he intended by what he wrote. All we have is the language he used from which we must deduce a meaning which we hope and have some reason to believe (based on language choices he made) is what he intended. You go on:

ROBERT: We may deduce that having the qualities of "man," homo erectus was also in a class or category of "man," but you'll notice that we have to indefinitize the noun grammatically to unambiguously express this idea. The GRAMMAR stipulates only that the qualities are attributed to the subject ("Homo Erectus is man" not "is a member of the category of man").

JB: Yes, Robert, ENGLISH makes this grammatical distinction, but GREEK does not. Take for example Mark 12:27: "He is not a god of the dead" or "He is not god of the dead." By your definition, a negated "qualitative." But it is expressed here by an article-less predicate noun AFTER the verb, so outside of Harner's set and surely indefinite grammatically. The very same semantic force is conveyed in Luke 20:38: "He is not a god of the dead" or "He is not god of the dead," but this time with an article-less predicate noun BEFORE the verb. You can see that these are interchangeable in meaning, while employing different word orders, one definitely indefinite in construction, the other looking just as indefinite, but falling into Harner's set. Greek does not appear to distinguish these the way Harner wants to. So, having made this point, let me move forward to something else you say.

WHAT DOES "QUALITATIVE" MEAN?

ROBERT: We're agreed that indefiniteness places a person or thing in a class or category. We're also agreed that indefiniteness implies that the attributes associated with the class are possessed by the member, at least to some degree. But I don't agree that there is no qualitative noun in Greek grammar. There are quite a few Greek scholars that do not agree with you on this point, either. I'm not making an appeal to authority, here - just pointing out that I'm not out on a limb on this one. If we accept as given that a non-definite noun may express two meanings - membership or qualities - it seems obvious that in any given context, a writer may be stressing one or the other. It's possible, as some have argued, that the writer may be equally stressing both, but I tend to think that writers have one specific semantic force in mind, and our inability, at times, to discern which force is intended is an artifact of the inherent ambiguity of language. I find Harner convincing that when the author intends to stress quality, he places the anarthrous noun prior to the copula. In such cases, I believe considering the noun qualitative more accurately reflects the author's meaning. I would never argue that John 1:1 (or any other disputed verse) proves that the semantic category of qualitativeness exists. Other semantic forces are possible in such a construction. However, I think there are rather clear examples of qualitative usage elsewhere, and quite a few of them. So, while I understand your view that qualitative = indefinite, I think this approach to semantics does not provide an adequate way to express the author's meaning.

JB; This is a very sound statement of a position that, while not in full agreement with mine, is defensible. I am willing to walk down this road with you, and assume a "qualitative" semantic force as something logically separable, and in English grammatically distinct, from an indefinite. The next question would be, what is meant by "qualitative"? What I find in what you have written in our discussion, and in some of the studies you cite, is a leap from the general, linguistic meaning of "qualitative" to a very specific philosophical concept of "in every sense the same as x." This same leap is made by Wallace and Hartley. But this very elaborate and restrictive definition of "qualitative" cannot be derived from the language alone, but is read into the language as a desired interpretation. It is a leap that cannot be substantiated, as you can see if you try to apply it to every case where a "qualitative" semantic force appears.

JB: We are just moving the question from one term to the next, from "quality" to "nature." When you use "nature" it has theological overtones derived from the philosophical elaboration of Christology that occurred over several centuries after John was written. Yes, that elaboration was based in part on what John wrote, and I am not arguing over whether or not that elaboration went in the right direction. What I am saying is that you cannot pack the entire content of that very carefully defined concept of "nature" into the linguistic designation "quality." "Quality" just isn't that precise, and any Greek scholar speaking about a "qualitative" sense in a noun in any other text would be really shocked to see the term construed as conveying the meaning you and others are giving it.

In the linguistic sense, "quality" means the character, condition, substance, status, etc. that something has. In any given case the exact nuance, the exact set of qualities that are being tapped into, will vary. That was the point I was trying to make by bringing up metaphor and simile -- NOT that John 1:1 is a metaphor or simile, because I don't think that -- but that both Greek and English are able to make metaphors and similes by constructing parallelisms that invoke some, but not all of the qualities possessed by the subject and object of the parallel. You say:

ROBERT: I think nouns with qualitative-indefinite or indefinite semantic forces can carry the sense to which you're referring. The predominant sense imparted by a qualitative noun is to attribute the qualities of the PN in full measure to the subject; at least I'm unaware of any counter-examples. It's possible there are some exceptions, and I'd like to learn of them if you know of any. But I think the "full measure" connotation is well established: When we read that God is spirit, or God is love, I don't think it's reasonable to conclude that there are some qualities of spirit lacking in God, or that He does not have all the qualities of love.

JB: I think part of the problem with us getting on the same page is that you keep taking your examples from theologically significant passages, where God or Christ is the subject, so naturally your beliefs read in "full measure." But if we look at examples where the subject is not so significant, you will see that your "full measure" over-determination of "quality" doesn't hold up. For example:

John 6:70 "One of you is a devil."

This sentence has an article-less predicate noun before the verb, just like John 1:1c. By what you've been arguing in line with Harner, we should consider it qualitative. Fine. Does Jesus mean that Judas (the implied subject) has the "full measure," that is every single one of the qualities of a devil? Well, some of the qualities of a "devil" are that it is disembodied, can move itself and others instantly over great distances, can possess people and animals, and has other powers humans do not have (all of this is biblical). Does Judas have even one of these qualities? No, he does not. So by calling Judas "a devil," Jesus is making a general association between Judas and a devil, one that draws on only some of a devil's qualities (such as maliciousness, betrayal, etc.). You see, a qualitative semantic function does not necessarily involve the "full measure" of qualities.

But the question is not "full measure" or "partial measure" as issues of INTERPRETING what John wrote. The question is how to TRANSLATE a qualitative noun. I think we have come very close to one another in recognizing that the traditional translation is flawed. But where we seem to be stuck is what is suitably put in its place. "A god," "god," "a divine being," "divine," even "deity" in the way you use it, mean the same thing. You simply cannot derive from the grammar anything as over-determined as "possessing all the qualities." That's an interpretation you are building on top of the grammar based on other passages. Interpretation is fine, but it shouldn't be confused with translation. If John wanted to say "possessing all the qualities" he certainly could have written that. This issue keeps coming up for us, as in the following exchange:

JB: It simply isn't relevant to the context that Pilate would mean "I don't have any of the qualities of a Jew." There is a specific reference point to which he is responding, and anything else is superfluous to the narrative. So it is arbitrary to pack the "full measure" of Jewishness into it. Likewise, in Mark 12:35: "The Messiah is a son of David." Jesus' own remarks here show that not all of the qualities are being invoked. Descent yes, but the hierarchical subordination of a son to a father is specifically rejected as not accurately connoted by this expression. The same holds true for the very verse Harner was most interested in exegeting, Mark 15:39: "Truly this man was a son of God." Is the centurion asserting that Christ had the "full measure" of qualities of a son of God? Contextual reading is essential here. The centurion is remarking on the evidence of what is happening around him that God loved this person like a son, and thus the signs of the cosmos being shaken and stirred by his death. He certainly is in no position to make claims about the person's birth (which is another member of the full set of qualities one would have as a son, but is not even a subject in Mark's gospel). "Son of God" was a widely used title for a person beloved of God, chosen or favored by God, and the centurion is portrayed invoking that sense of it. The title is used more fully, more significantly, in the mouth of others in the NT, perhaps even in the sense of the "full measure" of qualities of such a title. But not here.

HOW DO WE HANDLE "QUALITATIVE" NOUNS IN ENGLISH?
So if I go along, and say, "okay, let's call it qualitative," then our next joint task is to look at how English conveys qualitative relative to how Greek conveys it. Some examples from sentences using the same grammatical construct as John 1:1c:

John 4:19 "You are a prophet" not "You are prophet."
John 8:34 "Everyone who does sin is a slave of sin" not ". . . is slave of sin."
John 8:48 "You are a Samaritan" not "You are Samaritan."
John 9:24 "This man is a sinner" not "This man is sinner."
John 9:28 "You are a disciple of that man" not "You are disciple of that man."
John 10:1 "This one is a thief" not "This one is thief."
John 12:6 "He was a thief" not "He was thief."

I'm not going to argue that these are indefinites rather than qualitatives. You have cited several of them already as qualitative, and we'll just consider them qualitative. Even so, in English they must be translated as indefinites. That's just the way English conveys the meaning, which happens to be precisely the same way Greek does -- namely, by saying something is one of a category of things, you convey its quality. You say:

JB: I am not particularly interested in understanding theos as an adjective. I have simply pointed out that a predicate adjective is something we use in English to convey . . . "quality." For example, John 7:12 reads agathos estin, which can be translated as either "He is a good man" or "He is good." In both the original Greek and in English, the indefinite and the qualitative mean the same thing. In English you can use either an indefinite predicate noun or a predicate adjective; there is not even a shade of semantic difference.

So the problem here is that you work very hard to defend a "qualitative" reading of John 1:1c over against an indefinite one, and then you refuse to embrace the translational outcome of that "qualitative" reading because it does not, in itself, provide all of the interpretive restrictiveness you wish to impose on the verse. You want to move it back towards an individual meaning, a definite meaning, or at the very least to read "qualitative" in a very specialized way that simply does not apply to the ordinary linguistic meaning of that word. You want to infuse "quality" with theological significance. And that brings us back to the use of capitals. You say:

ROBERT: The use of the definite article "the Deity" signifies a certain person is in view; the anarthrous use ("Deity") does not signify the person, but the qualities of Deity. I won't quibble about the capital, other than to say that nouns may be capitalized for emphasis, not merely to signify a proper name.

JB: You're being disingenuous here, Robert. The qualitative sense you have been arguing so strenuously for REQUIRES a non-capitalized "d" in English. A capital "D" does not communicate the qualitative sense. It seems to me that something is holding you back from following through on the logic of your own position. What seems to be difficult for you to accept is that the qualitative semantic force rules out the traditional translation of John 1:1c, because capitalization of "God" or any substitute term does not convey the qualitative sense in English. Capitalization makes a noun proper, a name or title. John is not using it as either a name or title in 1:1c. Just as you wouldn't translate John 10:34 as "You are Gods," so you shouldn't arbitrarily use a capital in John 1:1c. Similarly, it is incorrect to translate 2 Thessalonians 2:4 as "he is God" (as some translations do). That's not the claim the antichrist makes, but rather that "he is a god," or, qualitatively, "he is god." Capitalizing "God" confuses the claim to belong to the category of "gods" or to have the qualities of a "god" with the claim to be specifically identical to the individual God. This confusion should be avoided here and, speaking strictly linguistically, as a matter of translation, the same holds true for John 1:1c.

ROBERT: It is, I think, the translator's burden to attempt to ascertain John's meaning as best he or she can by careful consideration of these larger chunks, rather than acquiesing to grammatical possibilities.

JB: What will set limits to your ability to read anything you might want into the Bible if you disdain to "acquiesce" to grammatical possibilities? The larger the "chunk" the more interpretive the reading, the more a generalized, abstracted, derived meaning can be injected into any one part. This gets to my whole point about bias, about the temptation not to be confronted by the challenges of the text. You and I have different definitions of contextual reading. For me the parts define the whole, while it seems to me that for you the whole defines the parts. I think the latter approach is too open to arbitrary harmonization, and what I mean by "harmonization" is imposing an agreement of passages on one's own terms, that is, what someone on their own thinking, prior to and outside of the text, thinks to be right and true. For me, close attention to the particulars, to the details of the individual passages, prevents me from having the free space in which I might unconsciously impose my will on the text. On your web site you characterize my position as "secular." Maybe I come across that way sometime, but I feel it to be a bit of an assumption on your part. After all, Christians believe in a God who reveals, and that revelation is communicated in language. Therefore, according to this set of beliefs, language is the key God has provided to knowing his will. If you presume to know God's will despite, rather than through, the language in which it is supposedly communicated, then the Bible will become merely the mirror of your own will, rather than the window to God's.

That's all for me. I know I haven't responded to all your questions, but I hope I have addressed the most salient points. Classes start on Monday and I must turn my full attention to them. I'll give you the last word, Robert. I'm sure our readers look forward to your response. Maybe we can pick up with some time in the future.

Best wishes,
Jason BeDuhn

What Does The Bible Really Teach

Thursday, 29 July 2021

Dr.J.Beduhn and R.Hommel: A Discussion upon the translation of John 1:1c.

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